Power market
S. M. Zabetian-Hosseini; M. Oloomi Buygi
Abstract
Intermittent nature of wind power faced ISO and power producers with new challenges. Wind power uncertainty has increased the required reserve capacity and deployment reserve. Consequently, large-scale wind power generation increases ISO costs and consequently reserve prices. On the other hand, since ...
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Intermittent nature of wind power faced ISO and power producers with new challenges. Wind power uncertainty has increased the required reserve capacity and deployment reserve. Consequently, large-scale wind power generation increases ISO costs and consequently reserve prices. On the other hand, since wind power producers are price taker, large-scale wind power generation decreases residual demand and consequently decreases energy and reserve prices. In this paper, impacts of large-scale wind power generation on energy and reserve markets are studied. To this end, we need to know bids of power producers. But, bids of power producers are unknown and changes if wind power penetration is varied. To overcome this problem, first equilibrium of day-ahead energy market is computed at the presence of large-scale wind power generation considering hour-ahead deployment reserve market scenarios. Then, equilibrium of hour-ahead reserve market is computed considering results of day-ahead market. Finally, impacts of large-scale wind power generation on energy and reserve markets are studied at the markets equilibria. The presented model is applied to an 18-unit power system and the results are analyzed.
Power market
M. Khafri; A. Badri; A. A. Birjandi
Abstract
In this paper, a heuristic mathematical model for optimal decision-making of a Distribution Company (DisCo) is proposed that employs demand response (DR) programs in order to participate in a day-ahead market, taking into account elastic and inelastic load models. The proposed model is an extended responsive ...
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In this paper, a heuristic mathematical model for optimal decision-making of a Distribution Company (DisCo) is proposed that employs demand response (DR) programs in order to participate in a day-ahead market, taking into account elastic and inelastic load models. The proposed model is an extended responsive load modeling that is based on price elasticity and customers’ incentives in which they participate in demand response program, voluntarily and would be paid according to their declared load curtailment amounts. It is supposed that DisCo has the ability to trade with the wholesale market and it can also use its own distributed generation (DG), while decision making process. In this regard, at first, DisCo’s optimization frameworks in two cases, with and without elastic load modelings are acquired. Subsequently, utilizing Hessian matrix and mathematical optimality conditions, optimal aggregated load curtailment amounts are obtained and accordingly, individual customer’s load reductions are calculated. Furthermore, effects of DG contributions and wholesale electricity market are investigated. An IEEE 18 bus test system is employed to obtain the results and show the accuracy of the proposed model.
Power market
N. Mostaghim; M. R. Haghifam; M. Simab
Abstract
Improving performance of electrical distribution companies, as the natural monopoly entities in electric industry, has always been one of the main concerns of the regulators. In this paper, a new incentive regulatory scheme is proposed to improve the performances of electrical distribution companies. ...
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Improving performance of electrical distribution companies, as the natural monopoly entities in electric industry, has always been one of the main concerns of the regulators. In this paper, a new incentive regulatory scheme is proposed to improve the performances of electrical distribution companies. The proposed scheme utilizes several efficiency assessments and a 3-dimentional reward-penalty scheme (3DRPS). Through efficiency assessments, economic efficiency and service quality, as two aspects of companies’ performances, are assessed and according to the results of such assessments, reasonable capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational expenditure (OPEX) for each company are calculated. Then, according to the reasonable CAPEX and OPEX, allowed revenues are calculated for next regulatory period. Moreover, the 3DRPS on quality is used to encourage the companies to maintain and improve their service quality during the regulatory period. The 3DRPS gives the incentive to the companies based on changes in their quality indices. The incentives are added to companies’ allowed revenues. Finally, the proposed scheme is applied to Iranian distribution companies and the results are discussed.
